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The massive historic protests in 2006 against anti-immigrant legislation in the United States have sparked renewed interest in immigrant community mobilization.
Analysts have turned to Mexican immigrants in particular, not in the least because Mexicans represent the largest immigrant group in the United States by far. In this focus, many scholars and policy makers both have trained their attention on one form of Mexican civic organization that played an important, yet somewhat unanticipated role in the proimmigrant marches of the mid-2000s: hometown associations, often called HTAs (Bada, Fox, and Selee 2006; García-Acevedo 2008; Portes, Escobar, and Radford 2007) . Broadly defined as organizations formed by migrants from a same community of origin (Fox and Bada 2009 ), they have been roundly lauded as structures that provide migrants with a wide array of support (Ramakrishnan and Viramontes 2010) . HTAs have been characterized as organizations through which migrants not only maintain their cultural identity and sustain their affective connection to their hometowns, but also as structures through which compatriots from the same community or region of origin can provide one another with social and material backing in the US (Bada 2011; Orozco 2004 ).
This recent interest in HTAs has dovetailed with the enthusiasm that economic development practitioners have displayed toward this organizational form (Aparicio and Meseguer 2008; Burgess 2008; Rodolfo García Zamora 2005) . For over a decade, development proponents of HTAs have described them as vehicles that enable migrants to participate in the economic development trajectories of their communities of origin, and perhaps more pointedly, they have identified them as effective funnels that direct remittances -the monies that migrants send home -toward public goods and business investment (Orozco 2004) . Despite their differing concern with HTAs, scholars of migrant civic engagement and economic development concur that HTAs are organizational structures that embody significant transnational expressions of migrant identity and engagement.
This essay enters this research terrain and looks specifically at the Mexican HTAs that have become a central object of investigation in both migration and development studies. For the most part, the Mexican HTAs examined represent very specific constructs:
with most founded over the last decade, they tend to be registered with Mexican government as formal civic organizations brought together by their affective ties to a community of origin. In a sense, the emphasis on this brand of HTAs is understandable; registration with state authorities makes them visible as objects of analysis, differentiating from other types of community mobilization, especially community drives that may be contingent and ephemeral, like the mounting of a cultural event or fair, or those that are organized under the umbrella of other institutions, like a church or workers center (Vertovec 2004) . By the same token, however, these HTAs, registered officially, are very particular organizational models. They can appear, and are actively represented in the literature, as civic organizations with clearly demarcated boundaries. They are viewed as autonomous and freestanding, even if they have extensive interactions with government authorities. Indeed, it is this supposed organizational independence even in the context of intense deliberations with the Mexican state, and for a time, with United States government authorities as well, that observers have identified as critical to the political sway that HTAs have been able to exercise (Smith and Bakker 2008; Waldinger, Popkin, and Magana 2008) .
My goal with this essay is to offer a cautionary note, and to suggest that the emphasis on HTAs as organizational structures may be incomplete. This attention to HTAs as a specific kind of civic form with functional organizational boundaries leads to an inaccurate gloss of HTAs as separate from the state institutions with which they interact. I argue instead that a more useful, and more accurate, way of considering Mexican HTAs is as social fields in which multiple actors negotiate both new expressions of transnational political identity and the possibilities for actions those identities allow. In other words, HTAs, rather than being freestanding civic organizations, are in fact well-trodden arenas of contestation, where migrants, state officials, and local communities on both sides of the United States-Mexico border wrestle over questions of identity, belonging, political power, and resources. Even more pointedly, the HTAs that have featured so centrally in migration and development analyses have emerged as spaces where migrants and state actors together elaborate Mexican policy toward its emigrants. In this respect, HTAs act as incubators for new migration and development policy approaches that are then extended well past the limited sphere of existing organized and registered HTAs to Mexican emigrants more broadly.
Considering HTAs as social fields where transnational identity and policy are contested and elaborated reveals just how variegated the practices that occur within the spaces they open still remain. This perspective highlights HTAs as theaters that host a flow of transnational political practices and identities that are contingent -that change depending on time and place (Abbott 1997; Landolt 2008) . The negotiations between migrants and the state, as well as the products of those contexts, are informed by the 3 specific political opportunities and constraints of the moment. Historical factors as broad as shifts in migration policy or changes in national leadership inform the way that migrants and state actors engage in the arenas that HTAs provide, but so too do more localized events such as the outcome of municipal elections, a poor crop, or a dispute over land ownership.
In addition to external historical events, however, contests within HTAs spaces are also shaped by the previous exchanges they hosted. The very local history of interactions within specific spaces offered by HTA supports but also constrains the possible identities and political strategies that they can spark (Sewell 2008) . Tending to the diversity and the historical specificity of the negotiations that occur in the context of HTAs is important, I
argue, because these exchanges determine the significance and impact of the migration and development policies that HTAs help produce and enact. The same policy interventions can -and do -have vastly different meanings and outcomes depending on the contexts in which they are enacted, and the HTAs that they involve.
To illustrate the role of HTAs as fields of social contest that shape migration and development policy, this essay relies on a layered research strategy. It focuses squarely on contemporary HTAs, formed within the last five years. It draws first on interviews with presidents of 38 Mexican HTAs primarily constituted in 2007 or later, with the lion's share registered in the last two years, and listed on a public registry maintained by the Mexican federal government; the sample included HTAs that were located in a wide array of US states, both traditional and newer areas of Mexican immigration, and that were based on affiliation to communities of origin in diverse municipalities throughout Mexico i . Interviews explored how the HTAs were formed, their current projects, and their interactions with various levels of the Mexican government (please see appendix 1 for summary statistics on the HTAs interviewed). These discussions were supported with interviews with current officials in instances of state and federal Mexican government, as well as a review of policy documents. In the second layer of research, the focus turns to HTAs from Zacatecas and Guanajuato, two Mexican states where exchanges between migrants and state actors have evolved in two very distinctive and emblematic ways: HTAs anchored in Zacatecas have tended to coalesce into large and politically powerful federations, whereas those from Guanajuatan communities have engaged with state government on a more individual basis.
The governments of these two states have some of the longest traditions of crafting policies to engage with migrants in United States, and their efforts are also some of the most robustly documented (Ferandez de Castro, García Zamora, and Ana 2006; Rodolfo García Zamora 2005; Ramírez 2012; Smith and Bakker 2008) . The state-level analysis for this essay includes interviews with representatives of HTAs or federations and with government officials. It also reviews the local Mexican press of exchanges between migrants and government officials. The third layer of research situates the cases of Zacatecan and Guanajuatan HTAs in their historical contexts, and draws on interviews with migrant activists and current and former government officials that participated in the creation of models of engagement between migrants and government characteristic of both states from the late 1980s through the late 2000s.
After opening with an overview of the analytic and policy treatments of contemporary HTAs, this essay offers a discussion of the range of exchanges between migrants and the Mexican government that are contained in the spaces that are opened when new HTAs are founded. It follows with a review of the historical evolution of HTAs in Zacatecas and Guanajuato to illustrate the ways in which HTAs are situated, in place and in time. It then concludes with a discussion of what the two models of exchange between migrants and the Mexican government in these two states suggest for how we might interpret HTAs as social fields where new practices of transnational identity, activism, and policy emerge.
A New Brand of Hometown Association?
By and large, analysts of Mexican hometown associations have billed them as new, sometimes path-breaking, expressions of transnational migrant political identity and as novel vehicles for engaging with the Mexican government. Other scholars, however, have cautioned that contemporary Mexican hometown associations have historical roots in the mutual aid societies that were so prevalent among Mexican immigrants in the early 1900s (Gonzalez 1990) , as well as in the community associations the internal migrants formed in the Mexican cities to which they moved (Fitzgerald 2008) . And they note, too, that the mutual aid societies and internal hometown associations had ties to government and other authorities (Smith 2003) : mutualistas registered and otherwise coordinated with Mexican consular officials to provide material assistance and cultural support to their members (Gonzalez 1990) . Associations made of internal migrants collaborated with the church and local government in their hometowns to donate money for projects both in the municipalities from which they came and the cities to which they moved.
But in a technical sense, observers of contemporary Mexican HTAs are correct. This is because they are, for the most part, considering migrant associations formed under the rubric of a matching funds program for local development projects that went into effect as national policy in 2002. The program, officially titled the "Three-for-One for Migrants" (henceforth 3x1) matches funds raised by groups of migrants for community projects in their towns and villages of origin. The schema is as the program name suggests: the federal, state, and municipal governments all contribute one dollar for each dollar that migrants raise. In order to participate in the program, migrants must form a hometown association and register their group with the Mexican federal government, either through consular offices or indirectly under the umbrella of existing federations of HTAs.
On its face, the initiative is modest. In 2010 ii , the federal budgetary allocation for the 3x1 program was approximately 50 million USD iii . The projects funded under the initiative were relatively small overall, with 2,438 projects completed that year, at an average budget per project of about 20,000 USD. As in previous years, the projects included basic infrastructure projects such as paving roads or laying down water pipes, the beautification or restoration of cultural spaces like churches and plazas, the construction of sporting arenas, clinics, or other community venues, and, in an emergent trend, investment in facilities to support local industry. In 2010, 881 HTAs, formed around topophilic identities to towns and villages in 664 municipalities spread across 28 Mexican states, participated in the program. Interpreting what close to 900 HTAs means however is complicated. Some were quite small, with no more than 10 members, whereas others were somewhat larger and belonged to federations of HTAs from the same Mexican state, some with membership bases that were quite strong. The HTAs that participated in 3x1 made up close to half of the 2,000 HTAs registered with the Mexican government over the life of the program. Nevertheless, in absolute numbers and, more saliently, relative to the total population of Mexican migrants in the United States, the adherents to the HTAs that have received so much attention represent a miniscule sliver of the Mexican migrant population iv (Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior 2011).
However, as the voluminous literature on the 3x1 program has documented, the Mexican government's matching funds program and the civic mobilization it has supported has had an outsized impact (R. García Zamora 2007; Goldring 2004; Kijima and Gonzalez-Ramirez 2012; Lopez 2009; Orozco 2004; Orozco and Garcia-Zanello 2009 ). The program, primarily through the HTAs it has instated, has been credited with improving the delivery of public goods in municipalities throughout Mexico (Bada 2008; Duquette 2011) . Tethering development projects to groups with strong interests and ties in specific communities has channeled public monies to some marginalized areas of the country that otherwise have had difficulty attracting public investment (Aparicio and Meseguer 2008) . Through their involvement in project design and in the supervision of implementation, HTAs have been identified as catalysts for the emergence of new forms of administration, most pointedly new mechanisms of accountability in local governance (Burgess 2008, forthcoming) . The most provocative outcome of the program noted by its observers is the increase in political influence that migrants have been able to exercise in their communities and in the states of origin (Smith and Bakker 2008) . Using the HTAs, and especially federations of HTAs, as their ballast, migrants have created increasingly sophisticated and powerful political lobbies; they have exercised electoral sway, among friends and relatives, but more significantly, in wider political debates; and they have wrested new rights of suffrage and political representation from both state and federal legislatures (Iskander 2010; Williams 2008) . So substantial has been their influence that many scholars, invoking Hirshman's triptych of avenues for political participation (Hirshman 1970) , have noted that HTAs have come to embody the vehicle through migrants exercise "voice" after "exit" (Duquette 2011; Fox and Bada 2008) .
HTAs created through the framework of the 3x1 program have been equally credited with supporting immigrant integration, advancement, and mobilization in the United States (Somerville, Durana, and Terrazas 2008) . Accounts of 3x1 HTA members informally providing one another with employment leads, donations for emergencies, and other kinds of material support are numerous, as are those of more formalized efforts to raise funds for scholarships and other awards (Bada 2008) . More compelling to analysts, however, has been the role that 3x1 HTAs have played in bolstering immigrant social movements. Mexican 3x1 HTAs in Los Angeles and Chicago have received particular attention because of success in connecting to broader pan-immigrant activism and to electoral campaigns (Cano 2009; Fox and Bada 2009; Shannon 2006; Smith 2007 ).
Most of these analyses have been attentive to the exchanges between 3x1 HTAs and the Mexican government, as they have occurred on both sides of the border. These interactions have been described as so intensive that they have supported forms of co-production (Ostrom 1996) between HTAs and government actors-co-production in the provision of public goods in Mexico, but also co-production of the political influence that HTAs have exercised (Cano and Délano 2007; Délano 2010; Duquette 2011) 
Co-Producing Hometown Associations
The interactions that have produced hometown associations are rich, fraught, and variegated. They have occurred between migrants and actors at various levels of government, and they have centered on myriad policy tools. Likewise, the exchanges have also displayed an array of strategies for social mobilization, as well as more than a few attempts at co-optation and control. It is this multivocal and intricate interplay that has given rise to Mexican HTAs as they are currently understood. An examination of these varied exchanges illuminates the important role they have played in creating the organizational forms that are credited with much social change, but that are themselves rarely considered as sites of contested political transformation.
In a 2008 presentation of the 3x1 program in Mexico City, directed at migrant leaders and various offices of government, the Mexican federal government describes it is an initiative set up in response to migrant desires to carry out community development projects in their hometowns, but also stresses that its scope stretches far beyond this mandate to advance additional government priorities. Central among these is the organization and mobilization of migrant communities in the United States. In this vein, the 3x1 initiative was represented as providing an important platform "to motivate migrants to identify with their communities in Mexico and with their country," and to draw on that identity to "foster and strengthen the formation of HTAs in the United States" and "to strengthen the organizational capacity of HTAs and migrant organizations in their dealings with the Mexican government and with the government of the country in which they reside" (SEDESOL 2008).
As part of its effort to further the goals it has around community mobilization, the HTAs that join a federation preferring to be listed under the larger organization's umbrella, rather than as individual groups.
According to officials in the federal government, the requirement for a toma de nota was put in place in response to migrant demands for greater transparency in the 3x1 program. Numerous migrant groups complained to the federal government that municipal presidents throughout Mexico, but especially from states where migrant HTAs and their federations were not well established, were submitting community development projects to the 3x1 on behalf of migrant HTAs that did not exist. These were "phantom clubs," as one Migrants' petition was that, at the very least, they be the main protagonists in the creation of their own HTAs, and that their membership be robust enough to qualify as a vibrant civic group. They demanded that their identity not be co-opted by a shell organization, headed by a migrant figurehead but deployed cynically by municipal governments to pad their budgets. In this sense, these government regulations were the product of exchanges between migrants and the Mexican state over what an HTA should be in practice. They were a reflection of migrants' rejection of the somewhat romanticized notions of HTAs as groups that formed organically and independently around altruistic, if also nostalgic, goals for their communities -notions that even the Institute for Mexicans Abroad embraced in their early consideration of HTAs, portraying them, in early project memos, as "effective social networks" that "provided an excellent vehicle to strengthen the ethical, moral, and civic values of the community"(Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior 2004). Migrants' complaint was also a "realpolitik" reminder to the federal authorities that HTAs were small groups that needed protection from the instrumental appropriation of their identities by government actors.
In addition to limiting the misuse of the 3x1 program, the guidelines have had two important implications for HTA organizing, and have shaped them as arenas when migrants and government interlocutors elaborate new forms of transnational civic identity and action. First, the regulations have provided migrant groups with a solid springboard for organizing and for pushing past inertia or ambivalence among their adherents and potential adherents for mobilizing. One HTA anchored in a community in Durango observed, for example, "our group was formally established in 2011 after working informally for six years. We were just a few people and then grew to ten so that we could meet the requirement for participating in the 3x1" (Interview, March 2012). This experience was echoed by a majority of the HTAs interviewed; indeed, 6 out of 38 organizations sampled reported that they registered with the consulate in the hopes of putting together a 3x1 project, but had not yet identified the project that they wanted to complete or were still finalizing its design (Interviews, March-April 2012). One leader of an HTA representing a community in Puebla located in the wider New York metropolitan area noted that he had worked with Mexican community organizations in the city for close to a decade but had found them "very disappointing…lacking a true community base and lacking leadership, without a true representation from the community," and it was this frustration, rather than a targeted ambition to complete defined 3x1 projects, that motivated him with others to start a formal HTA. As he explained, "if you don't get people to come together here, even as they integrate into this society, you cannot achieve development [in our communities of origin]" (Interview, March 2012).
The formal registration of an HTA or a federation of HTAs provides a critical point of contact between consular officials and migrants who might otherwise remain unknown to them. While interviews reveal that there is considerable variation among consular offices in the ways they respond to this connection, with several HTA leaders noting that interactions with consular staff were largely transactional, numerous HTAs reported receiving substantial and ongoing mentorship in organizing capacity. Descriptors that were articulated repeatedly in response to questions about consular offices were that the staff was "very helpful"; HTA presidents reported that their groups were "well-received" and they benefited from "good orientation" about how to set up and maintain an HTA (Interviews, March-April 2012) . One leader of an HTA rooted in Hidalgo recounted, for example, that she had started and HTA in 2005, but that it was through interactions with staff from the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (IME), a government agency that coordinates policy toward emigrants, and staff at the consulate that she learned her HTA could form a federation with other groups from the same state. "The consular office gave us a lot of support with meetings on a monthly basis to guide our experience, to register, to learn the rules…to prepare project paperwork and demonstrate the viability of our projects so that they could be approved… The support we received as a federation was really very good" (Interview, March 2012).
Based on the limited interview sample used for this essay, it is difficult to determine conclusively how widespread is the consular practice of using HTAs registration as the beginning of capacity building efforts. Nevertheless, federal government officials report that this is an important thrust of their activities. As explained by a 3x1 official at the federal level, the directory acts as a foundation for consular outreach activities: "The function of the toma de nota is first and foremost to give the consulates an opportunity to be familiar with the work of the clubs" (Interview, April 2012). "Each consulate uses the directory in its own way, depending on its respective approach and work with HTAs,"
confirmed an official at the IME. "Some might use it to identify which clubs are in existence in their areas and invite them to come to a training at the consulate" (Interview, April 2012). In this respect, the toma de nota process provides the Mexican government with a crucial optic onto migrant civic organization; it makes the extent and location of migrant organizing efforts visible and legible. The IME does not have a census or complete database of migrant groups; indeed, by their own report, they only know how many and which groups have acquired the toma de nota under 3x1 regulations (Personal communication,
April 2012).
The outreach use of the registry of the tomas de nota mandated by the 3x1 program points to the second function the matching funds program plays in creating spaces for the development of transnational political identities. It is no accident that the IME views HTAs as "our reason for being" (Interview, April 2012). For the Mexican federal government, HTAs are doorways to the broader migrant population, but they are also spaces where migrant rights and activism around other issue areas beyond imperatives of the 3x1 program are explored. As one staff member explained, HTAs "provide us with a structure through which we can reach the community. HTAs are like 'arms' that extend our outreach capacity." And that outreach that HTA networks support engages with numerous issue areas, such as "financial education, health programming, empowerment, and the protection of migrants' rights" (Interview, April 2012).
Moreover, in much the same way that the issue areas the Mexican federal government has addressed with HTAs have expanded past the prerogatives of the 3x1, the organizational capacity building efforts have as well. The IME has worked with HTAs and held leadership seminars in Chicago, Houston, New York, Washington D.C. and San Francisco in collaboration with the American Jewish Committee to draw on the experience of Israel and its engagement with Jewish communities in the United States. It has also offered leadership training in partnership with local universities, most recently with the City University of New York. As a staff member at the IME clarified, the goal of these training sessions is much broader than to support the functioning of a single government program. Rather, "the aim of these workshops is to develop capacity among Mexican community leaders to create opinion leaders, local functionaries, entrepreneurs, and more While the Mexican government has strengthened its efforts to provide a broader platform for migrant organizing and integration in the host society, the focus for migrants who have formed HTAs more recently, however, has remained the 3x1 program. Many of the HTA leaders interviewed acknowledged that their organizations provided forms of support to its members that were ancillary to the task of carrying out a matching funds project, and they also noted the services provided by consular offices were helpful in this respect, as well as in its general support of "el movimiento migratorio" -the immigrant movement (Interviews, March 2012). Nevertheless, the main goal of their HTAs was funding and completing a development project, however conceived, in their community of origin. Likewise, their primary expression of transnational civic identity was anchored in the towns and villages from which they heralded. This hometown affiliation has been central to civic participation even in arenas that are not defined by actions related to their communities of origin. Migrant participation in larger federation of HTAs, for example, which are built around a state-wide political identity, began with identities that were rooted in hometowns. Although federation activists came to embrace a political identity that was centered on their state of origin, migrants' entry into federations has been through topophilic actions and identities located in their hometown, structured to a great extent by the 3x1 program. This trend can be observed even relation to activism in the United States.
Migrant social mobilization against anti-immigrant legislation in the late 2000s, as well as more formal political participation in electoral campaigns, was nurtured in spaces, both physical and symbolic, that were created around expressions of hometown solidarity that had coalesced into larger state-based identities. In Chicago, for example, the Casa Michoacán, a physical space (a house in Pilsen) grounded in a Mexican state identity, emerged as one of the most important meeting sites for mobilization against the restrictive Sensenbrener bill (Bada 2008) . Similarly, in Los Angeles, the Frente Civico Zacatecano, a political group that grew out of the Federación de Clubes Zacatecanos del Sur de California, was active in numerous electoral contests, including those for mayor, state representatives, and county sheriff (Smith and Bakker 2008) . Newer HTAs, while maintaining their keen interest in the 3x1, have joined these political efforts. As one HTAs president interviewed commented, "migrants advance through struggle and demands -a través de luchas y exigencias. It is a matter of how motivated we migrants are to improve our lives and how we learn how to do achieve this" (Interview,
March 2012).
Unlike the ongoing exchanges and political negotiations between HTAs and state government, interactions at the municipal level appear far more mercurial and tense. In interviews, a common complaint regarding municipal authorities was that they were nakedly partisan in their selection of projects and were obstructionist with projects that did not improve their political party's political standing. "HTAs receive much more outreach from municipal presidents during an election year. It is a political exchange," said one HTA president. "Our relationship with the municipal government has been antagonistic. It has been really hard to get the mayor [municipal president] to give political support to the project, but a new mayor took office in January so it might get better," reported another.
Because municipal authorities implement the actual project, handling construction and coordination, HTA presidents observed that local authorities often have influence that is greater than the proportion of funds they contribute to any given project. "The municipal president determines the project we do….In our view, the [municipal] In order to exercise greater control over the project budgets and project implementation, many HTAs now work with "mirror committees"-comités de espejomade up of residents in the community of origin. HTAs and federations in states that have a longer and more intensive history with the 3x1 program, like Zacatecas, Jalisco and Michoácan, formed citizen supervisory committees to monitor 3x1 projects, often taking the protective measure of creating an account for 3x1 funds that was separate from any municipal accounts. In 2005, the federal government took up this innovation and sponsored the formation "mirror committees" as a means to address the problem of "phantom HTAs" created on paper by municipal authorities (Shannon 2006) . As a result, their embeddedness in the local community was mixed, with some "mirror committees" emerging as significantly more representative of local community interests than others, which functioned more as extensions of the municipal government (Burgess 2008 ). This initiative continued nevertheless, and was institutionalized as part of the 3x1 program in 2009. The HTAs sampled had a favorable view of these committees, considering them essential to effective project implementation. Indeed, for some HTAs, the "mirror committees" did more than increase accountability: they served as an indispensable bridge for migrants to their communities of origin, especially when travel back to Mexico was complicated by migrants' lack of legal immigration status, and facilitated deliberation with local residents about project choice: "We now have a mirror committee," explained one president from HTA rooted in Hidalgo, "The community, together with the rotating membership of the committee, helps select the projects. The committee has been indispensable and without it, it would not be possible to do the projects" (Interview, March 2012). Some also observed that the mirror committees have taken on their own initiatives to push for improved government service and to author social change, a claim echoed by scholars who have analyzed the effect of the 3x1 on local mobilization in Mexico (Bada 2008; Duquette 2011 ).
Overall, presidents of the newer HTAs interviewed saw the 3x1 program as a work in progress. According to them, it has provided migrants with a springboard from which to organize, and has opened up channels for them to engage with the various instances and levels of the Mexican government. "Though there are problem with the program, it is really important because it is the only thing we have," summed up one HTA president. "The concept is excellent, but the structure is deficient" ( Federations also provide a platform for knowledge sharing among HTAs, holding yearly plenary meetings where insights about strategy are exchanged. Furthermore, in recognition of the fact that the membership of newer HTAs is more likely to include undocumented migrants, and that thus travel represents risking deportation, federations are increasingly fostering knowledge exchange through telephone calls and email. Thus, for Zacatecan HTAs, their primary contact with any instance of Mexican government is through the federations.
As one federation president summed it up, "the federation is really their universe of operation" (Interview, April 2012).
To support these activities, it has been common practice among federations to charge member HTAs an annual fee, which appears to be proportional to the political clout that the charging federation possesses in Zacatecas; the Federación de Clubes Zacatecanos de la Costa Oeste, which was created in 2003 and thus is among the most recently founded and which "specializes" in HTAs in places like Utah and the Carolinas that are geographically isolated from major federations, charges 150 USD, whereas the Federación de Clubes Zacatecanos del Sur de California, which was, until early 2012, the most powerful federation, levied a fee of no less than 2,000 USD. But the argument articulated by federations is that this fee and the mandated membership for HTAs is a means to enhance migrant influence. "What this rule is really enforcing is the affiliation of clubs with federations in order to make federations more politically powerful," explained one federation president interviewed. "This is a lever of power that the state government can rely upon when they need something… for example, a humanitarian visa or repatriation of Interviews, April 2012). Beyond this initial encouragement, however the state government has offered little additional support and no guidance to HTAs in launching a 3x1 project. It has instead opted to deploy a state-focused outreach strategy, historically technocratic and top-down, through its Dirección de Atención a Comunidades Guanajuatenses en el Extranjero (DACGE). The centerpiece of this strategy has been creation of Casas Guanajuato, groups of migrants with which the state government works to secure non-profit status in the United States. The Casas program was designed to create topophilic identities among migrants that were fixed on their state of origin rather than on the town and villages from which they came. As the governor who initiated the program in 1994, Carlos Medina, explained, "We wanted [migrants] to look toward Guanajuato and its government for their future. And that's why we decided that the Casas Guanajuato should have a larger state identity, rather than be identified with a given municipality. And anyway, how much can a municipality really do for migrants in any case?" (Interview, July 2003).
The Casas program has a mixed track record, with many of the Casas collapsing into shell organizations with minimal or no membership, covered by a migrant figurehead (Faret 2006; Iskander 2010) . Of late, however, the Casas program has seen the increased migrant participation; 3x1 HTAs have appropriated it to tap into the organizational support that the state government offers and, most especially, to take advantage of the privileged access to government authorities that being a "Casa" can afford an HTA. Similarly, there has been an incipient movement to forge federations of Guanajuatan HTAs, and new federations report working in conjunction with the Casas program. As one federation president explained, several HTAs can come together under the banner of a single Casa (Interview, April 2012). However, Guanajuatan federations and supra-Casas still remain organizationally weak, especially when compared with their Zacatecan counterparts. They have displayed disappointing uptake, with HTAs in the same geographic area -indeed the same city -preferring to remain independent HTAs rather than joining forces with a larger network of hometown organizations. In this sense, migrant groups, even though they have drawn on the Casa program resources to create organizations rooted in their hometowns, remain resistant to the project of embracing a state-wide --and, more importantly, state government-defined --civic identity.
The difference in organizational strength between Zacatecan and Guanajuatan migrant groups and the intensity of exchanges with state actors that have produced them is the product of distinct historical trajectories -trajectories which continue to inform how shovel-ready projects in a briefcase. According to some of the staff members who carried out this organizing north of the border in the mid-1990s, this was done strategically to provide the new HTA with a task around which its members could mobilize, and thus reinforce the group's nascent structure (Interviews, March-May 2003) . In addition to working together around the matching funds program and its evolution, migrants and the state government formed common cause in protecting the program from repeated federal attempts to co-opt it or fold it into larger national initiatives that were not migrant-specific.
Irrespective of whether state officials or migrant federations were at the forefront, these political battles were always joint efforts: indeed, federations and state officials caucused about who should be the face of their resistance to the proposed policy changes. These efforts cultivated the ability of federations and state government to coordinate politically, but more importantly, they sharpened the skill of Zacatecan federations to mobilize and lobby in varied political arenas. And mobilize they did: they soon wrested from the state and national legislatures new rights of suffrage and political representation, and secured unprecedented access to presidential administrations in both countries. Until migration reform became an issue too volatile for the presidents of both the United States and Mexico to touch, Zacatecan migrants -émigrés from a poor state in Mexico of a little over 1 million inhabitants out of a national 100 million -had audiences with Presidents Fox and Bush.
Indeed, some of the political issues at stake were too explosive even for federations themselves to manage. Political party affinities and electoral battles produced the first Moreover, in Zacatecas, the COVAM, on its face a bureaucratic instrument to ensure accountability in program implementation, continues to be adapted by migrant and state actors for uses that exceed its technical mandate even while strengthening it. Several idiosyncratic practices have been put in place in Zacatecas to ensure that the COVAM acts fairly: for example, one of the four municipal seats on the committee is given to each of the four parties that are most active in Zacatecas, regardless of the number of municipalities they govern, in order to prevent party capture. Likewise, the four seats granted to the federations rotate among the federations (currently 17) that are registered with the federal government. But the COVAM meetings, held quarterly either in the United States or Mexico, also act as critical convenings for the federations, regardless of whether they have a seat on the committee that year. Over the two days or so involved in the COVAM approval process, federations hold a series of side meetings, during which they caucus, identify their The COVAM in Guanajuato could not be more different in structure and in process than the 3x1 committee meetings for Zacatecas. In Guanajuato, the COVAM hews very closely to its technical function, as dictated by the 3x1 program guidelines, and its proceedings, which are more perfunctory and occur seven times a year, are administrative in tone. Moreover, participation on the committee is assigned, with little contestation. This emphasis on productivity in Guanajuato's policy toward its migrants has historical roots, and new HTAs anchored in the state enter a logic to which migrant groups have long been subject. Like Zacatecas, Guanajuato has some of the longest standing statelevel outreach efforts to emigrants in Mexico. Alongside its outreach efforts to migrants through the provision of services and the support for the Casas program, the state government has strived to make remittances more "productive." Rather than having them spent on uses that the government viewed as consumption, including, in this definition, expenditures on housing, food, and schooling, the state wanted to direct a larger proportion of the monies migrant sent home to business investment. To that end, the state created its own version of a matching funds arrangement for small firms. The scheme, called Mi Comunidad, was launched in 1996 and functioned as follows: the state government encouraged migrants, individually and in groups, to raise start-up funds for small firms in their hometown -chiefly clothing maquilas on the forceful suggestion of government bureaucrats-which one or more of them would return to manage. In return, the state promised to match their investment with in-kind contributions of installations, machinery, training, and wage subsidies. Thirteen firms were established under the program, and as the governor of Guanajuato at the time -Vicente Fox -ascended to the presidency in 2000, he pledged the start-up 100 Comunidades firms in his first 100 days in office. (Iskander 2010) The program was a spectacular bust. Firms were located in isolated communities, far from industry supply chains, and hampered by deficient road and communication infrastructure, with landline telephones that worked sporadically. Within five years, all but one firm had failed, with the owner of the remaining firm contemplating migrating back to the United States to raise capital for his failing enterprise (Iskander 2005) . Not only did the state inventions that were so trained on productivity goals fail to provide adequate business support to migrant investors in its flagship program, the state government failed then, and continues to fail now, to provide support for organizing. The case of Guanajuato illustrates well that without state participation in the development of migrant organizations -without its co-production of HTAs and their federations -the mobilization efforts of migrants are likely to stay underdeveloped. HTAs remain small, atomized organizations that pose little political threat to the state government and its neo-liberal vision of development. But by the same token, the HTAs that emerge today through the 3x1 program are less likely to gather the required political strength and exercise the necessary sway to compel innovations in policy, as migrants did so effectively in Zacatecas.
The Road from Guanajuato to Zacatecas
In Zacatecas, in Guanajuato, and indeed, in all Mexican states, the hometown associations rooted there have not been simply groups of migrants who had come together around topophilic ties. Rather, they have been, and continue to be, produced by intensive exchanges between migrants and government interlocutors. It is this interplay between migrants and government actors that gives HTAs their organizational structure, and opens program matches -in a one-for-one ratio -the investment that a single migrant family makes in a business initiative. The program essentially acts as a vehicle and a subsidy for microcredit, in a credit market that is tight for small and rural entrepreneurs. Ironically, the 1x1 program is favored by migrants from Guanajuato, the state that supplied the conceptual framework for this policy, precisely because it allows them to bypass municipal and state levels of government, and deal instead directly and solely with the federal government. In Zacatecas, however, the program has taken a new shape: as of the last electoral contest in 2010, it has become the 2x1 program, with additional contribution from the state government. Projects are vetted by the federations, which, in most cases, extend ongoing technical support to the new entrepreneurs. Moreover, through the involvement of the state government, the projects -mezcal factories, cyber cafes, hair salons, pig farms, and dehydration of specialized chilies, among others -have entered the development planning discussions at the state level, infusing considerations about how to upgrade the production of niche agricultural goods for export with new energy. These exchanges between HTA federations and the state planning office may not be sufficient to resolve the shortcomings that have hamstrung initiatives of this type in the past, but they will certainly contribute to policy reflection about how to better support microenterprises in Zacatecas and beyond.
In this instance again, diminutive Zacatecas emerges as a dynamic incubator for innovative policy. This effervescent creativity is the product of the same exchanges that produce HTAs and their federations. In other words, not only do interactions between government actors (armed with their policy tools) and migrants co-produce HTAs, but they also co-produce new development trajectories at the local and national levels.
Consequently, attention to the quality of those exchanges is vital: they can support the elaboration of new development approaches even as they support migrant mobilization on both sides of the border, or they can hobble, sometimes definitively, migrant efforts at organizing and collaborating with one another and with their governments. As Mexico now faces a situation where migration has crested and is currently at a steady state with net migration at zero (Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera 2012) , it also enters an era where the benefits of emigration to the country will come less in the form of remittances and more through the ingenuity of its migrants. Looking within the organizational boundaries of HTAs to identify which amongst the many varied and contested interactions that occur within these topophilic organizations support creativity, and which have caused migrants instead to retreat from exchanges with government and from top-down clientilistic interactions, is arguably more important now than ever.
i Interviews for the essay were all conducted in Spanish. Interviews in 2012 were conducted over the telephone, but earlier interviews were conducted in person. While some information is provided about the affiliation of the interviewees, identifying information is withheld in order to maintain the confidentiality of the interviewee's identity. ii The latest officially released program data for the full calendar year at the time of writing was 2010. iii The federal budgetary allocation is the most reliable figure to determine the size of the 3x1 program because both federal and state authorities will occasionally cover the shortfall in the contribution of migrants or of municipal governments. iv According to a survey conducted by the Pew Hispanic Center, no more than 14 percent of Mexicans in the US participate in civic organizations, sports teams, or social clubs that bring together migrants from the same community of origin. While HTAs subject to analysis fall in this category, the vast majority is more formalized that this loose description would suggest and likely only represent a tiny fraction of the organizations to which this survey refers. (Suro 2005) . v Newspapers surveyed for this essay include: El Sol de Zacatecas; El Mirador; El Sol de Leon, Guanajuato; and Reforma. 
